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The emission of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide, and the consequent
potential for climate change are the focus of increasing international concern. Tem-
porary land-use change and forestry projects (LUCF) can be implemented to offset
permanent emissions of carbon dioxide from the energy sector. Several approaches
to accounting for carbon sequestration in LUCF projects have been proposed. In the
present paper, the economic implications of adopting four of these approaches are
evaluated in a normative context. The analysis is based on simulation of Australian
farm–forestry systems. Results are interpreted from the standpoint of both investors




Concerns over global warming have led to proposals for the establishment of
markets for greenhouse gas emission reductions. Although formal markets
have not emerged, a number of international exchanges have occurred,
whereby power companies and other energy-intensive industries have invested





and other greenhouse gases (GHG) (Hassall and Associates 1999, p. 23).
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) has provided the context in which much of the
policy debate on global warming has occurred. The KP established a commit-
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Annex I countries include the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment countries (except Mexico and Turkey) and transition economies in eastern Europe. 
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to reduce their GHG emissions by an aggregate 5 per cent relative to their
1990 emissions.
The KP contains two articles of special relevance to this paper:




 states that ‘any Party included in Annex I may transfer to,
or acquire from, any other such party ERU resulting from projects aimed
at  reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropo-
genic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy’,
subject to certain provisos. This mechanism covers the so-called activities
implemented jointly. The proposed medium of exchange under this Article
is the Emission Reduction Unit (ERU).




 the Clean Development Mechanism, has the purpose of
assisting ‘Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable develop-
ment and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and
to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their
quantiﬁed emission limitation and reduction commitments …’. The pro-
posed medium of exchange under this Article is the Certiﬁed Emission
Reduction.
There has been much debate regarding the kinds of activities that may





. 2000). Much of the controversy has been in regard to land-use
change and forestry (LUCF) activities. Forestry and other land-use activ-




. Growing forests contribute to




 emissions by ﬁxing carbon in wood, leaves and
soil. Some parties (particularly the European Union) are opposed to the
eligibility of LUCF projects for carbon credits, while other parties (particu-
larly the USA) argue in their favour. The problem of permanence, which
is the focus of the present paper, arises because LUCF projects tend to be




 captured during forest growth is released upon
harvest. In contrast, projects in the energy sector that reduce emissions are
permanent, in the sense that an avoided emission will never reach the
atmosphere. So, in comparing sources and sinks, the duration of a carbon
sequestration project is important because, whereas technological advances
in the energy sector have a permanent mitigation effect, forestry projects
will release carbon upon harvest.
The issue of permanence must be addressed before LUCF projects are
acceptable in a carbon-credit market. Proponents of LUCF projects point
to several advantages of temporary sequestration such as: (i) some propor-
tion of temporary sequestration may prove permanent; (ii) deferring cli-
mate change has beneﬁts; (iii) temporary sequestration ‘buys time’ while
affordable energy technologies are developed; and (iv) temporary sequestra-
tion projects have value, in saving time to gain information on the process
of global warming (Lecocq and Chomitz 2001). 
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The European Union, Japan and other countries have ratiﬁed the KP,
whereas the USA and Australia have refused to ratify it. Although the
withdrawal of the USA will result in a smaller market for emission offsets,
implementation of the Protocol is proceeding. The subject of the present
paper has relevance even outside the KP, as it is part of the general issue of
valuing environmental services. The analysis presented here also has appli-
cation to current pilot projects in Australia. The Victorian Government
recently implemented a ‘BushTender’ initiative through which landholders
have been paid to conserve areas of native vegetation on their properties.
NSW has followed this with an ‘Environmental Services Scheme’ currently
being implemented. Landholders will receive payments for changing their
land-use practices and improving the environmental services they provide
through their properties.
In the present paper, we review four accounting methods that have been
proposed to allow sources and sinks of GHG to be compared. We use the
term ‘carbon credits’ to refer to any exchange mechanism, whether the
exchange occurs within an international market or at the national or state
level. We develop an economic model for each accounting system considered
and use a numerical example, based on simulation of a forest plantation
in Australia, to study the economic implications of the different account-
ing systems. The analysis focuses on the standpoint of an individual landholder,
but implications to investors are also discussed. We conclude by discussing
the implications of our results from a policy perspective and identify possible
obstacles to implementation.
 
2. The role of land-use change and forestry
 
Although the main focus in the global-warming debate is on emissions
(sources), the role of sinks, such as carbon sequestration in trees, has also




 from the atmosphere during photo-
synthesis and store the carbon in wood, leaves and roots; while the oxygen
is released back into the atmosphere. When trees die, carbon remains in the





. 2001). However, if living trees are harvested the fate of
the carbon depends on the end use of the forest products. For example, car-
bon may be stored for many years in durable wood products such as con-
struction timber, but for only a few years in paper and pulp, before being





Lecocq and Chomitz (2001) use an optimal control model of global mitiga-
tion strategies to show that temporary sequestration projects can be cost
effective in the short to medium term, provided the marginal damage of cli-
mate change being offset by the project is high enough. They also point out 
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  concentrations below a threshold level. In such cases, ‘the
sequestration project serves to bridge the “hump” of high energy abatement
costs’ (Lecocq and Chomitz 2001, p. 21).
 






 has received the most attention because of its concen-
tration in the atmosphere and because it is the main gas emitted by burning
fossil fuels. Gases differ in their capacity to cause global warming, and
their resident times in the atmosphere also vary. Greenhouse gas emissions




 equivalents, a measure that takes the warming poten-









is based on an arbitrary time period of 100 years; this time frame is deter-









. (2000) to derive an equivalence factor that represents
the amount of time temporary carbon must be stored in biomass in order to
be considered equivalent to a permanently avoided emission. We apply their
concept in the present paper and incorporate it into an economic framework.
Carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere follows a complex decay path.
There is an initial fast decay caused by uptake by the biosphere over the
ﬁrst 10 years or so; followed by a gradual decay over the next 100 years or
so reﬂecting transfer to the ocean and, ﬁnally, a very slow decline occurs





. 1995, p. 217). To evaluate this decay process the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in their Special Report on Climate
Change used a carbon-cycle model that incorporates interactions between
the atmosphere, oceans and land systems (the Bern model).
The problem of permanence is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The top panel




 emitted into the atmosphere (the




. 2000). The bottom panel shows the




 (i.e. a negative emission).
The area between the horizontal axis and the decay curve is a measure of




 emitted in year zero. The tonne-
year approach consists of ﬁnding the number of years required to make the
bottom (rectangular) area equal to the top area (ﬁgure 1), thereby making




Other important GHG in the context of land use are methane and nitrous oxide, that








In many of their analyses the IPCC also uses 20-year and 500-year time horizons. 
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) and turns out to be 46 years under the
revised Bern model.
Hence, under the tonne-year system a LUCF project has to keep an




  out of the atmosphere for 46 years in order to
receive the same credit as an energy project that decreases emissions by the
























 out of the atmosphere for one year.



























 has the largest scien-
tiﬁc uncertainty of the major GHG. This is because the rate of its uptake
is a complex process involving the biosphere, oceans, ocean–atmosphere
exchange rates, deep ocean sediments, etc. As pointed out by Chomitz
(2000), there is no unique way to determine the conversion rate between
tonne-years and perpetual tonnes; the choice from a set of scientiﬁcally
sound approaches is a policy decision. It is possible that the decision will
Figure 1 The permanence problem and equivalence time (Te). The top area is the decay path of
atmospheric CO2  based on the Revised Bern Model; the bottom area represents carbon
sequestration. 
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take environmental and social objectives into account in addition to net





In this section we describe four accounting systems that compare sources
and sinks of GHG. The ﬁrst is what we call the ideal system, one where
credits and debits accrue in the year they are incurred. The other three systems













from each other in the timing of carbon-credit payments. The three latter
approaches have been discussed in the published literature at a general
level, but no formal economic analysis has been undertaken previously.
 
4.1 Ideal accounting system
 
Under the ideal accounting system, payment for carbon sequestration
occurs as the service is provided and a debit occurs when carbon is released
(i.e. by ﬁre or harvest). Consider the case of a landholder evaluating the







) of carbon dioxide sequestered by those trees. The value of a
stand of forest in the presence of carbon-sequestration payments and with

















planting. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents the value of the
timber harvest, the second term represents the sum of the annual net bene-

























































and the carbon stock in forest biomass in tonnes per hectare (tC/ha). The
last term in (1) represents the assumption that credits obtained during forest















 as explained later in the present report.
The full debit at harvest means that the total amount of carbon credits
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the landholder. Although not all carbon is released back to the atmosphere
upon harvest, because a large proportion may remain ﬁxed in wood prod-
ucts for decades, this model assumes a contract that ends when the carbon
sequestered is no longer under the control of the landholder. In other
words, the contract between an investor (i.e. a power company) and a land-
holder to capture and maintain a given amount of carbon out of the atmo-
sphere expires when the forest is harvested. This is because the carbon is no
longer under the control of the landholder, who therefore cannot guarantee
that the terms of the contract will continue to be fulﬁlled. Once the con-
tract expires, the investor would have to ﬁnd an alternative sequestration
project, or pay a carbon tax. This scheme is equivalent to the rental carbon








The tonne-year method does not require redemption of carbon credits
upon harvest, because payment occurs based only on the ‘equivalent’
amount of permanently avoided emissions during a given year. Payment is





. Under tonne-year accounting with annual payments, the objective
function is:
(2)
The sequestered carbon is credited annually in a similar way to the ideal







carbon stock receives payment each year. This method has the advantage
that no guarantee that the project will last a given number of years is
required, as the annual payments are adjusted by the equivalence factor. If
the project is abandoned and the carbon is released, the investor does not
need to recover payments from the landholder.
 
4.3 Ex-ante full crediting
 
Another accounting method discussed by Moura-Costa and Wilson (2000)
consists of paying carbon credits in full when the project starts. This







time required to offset a unit of emissions. This means that an up-front
payment is made when the project starts for the carbon stock that will be
sequestered to year T, but only the carbon stock accumulated in the period
from year zero to year T−Te receives credit. The objective function is:
πυ 2
0
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(3)
The value of T must be speciﬁed in the contract before up-front payment
occurs. If the forest is retained for 46 years or less (T ≤ Te), timber is the
only source of revenue (the top row of equation 3 applies) and the land-
holder does not participate in the carbon market, so no contract is estab-
lished and no up-front payment occurs. Carbon payments apply only for
the stock of carbon that is retained in the forest for 47 years or longer (the
bottom row in equation 3). This method is also based on the tonne-year
concept, but it uses the equivalence time (Te) rather than the equivalence
factor. This method can provide a strong incentive for forest establishment,
because of the large initial carbon-credit payment (the payment is not dis-
counted). However, the cost of providing a guarantee of permanence would
reduce the size of the incentive.
4.4 Ex-post full crediting
The ﬁnal accounting method analysed here, also proposed by Moura-Costa
and Wilson (2000), consists of paying carbon credits once the project
reaches Te years. The carbon payments are made from year Te until harvest.
The objective function becomes:
(4)
As in model (3), under this method carbon payments apply only if T > Te.
However, payments are based on annual ﬂows of carbon sequestration
(rather than stocks) and they are heavily discounted, as they start in year
Te. Although this method does not require a guarantee, the delayed pay-
ment eliminates the incentive provided by a cash ﬂow in the early years of
the project.
4.5 Inﬁnite horizon
The proﬁt functions deﬁned account for only one forest cycle, and ignore
the proﬁts from future harvests, or the opportunity cost of delaying the
harvest. With an inﬁnite planning horizon the proﬁt function for account-
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(5)
Where the numerator is any of the functions deﬁned in (1) to (4). By maxi-
mizing (5) with respect to T we ﬁnd the optimal forestry cycle (in years) for
an inﬁnite planning horizon.
To  implement this model it is necessary to deﬁne tree growth and that
determines carbon accumulation, b(t), the volume of timber available for
harvest, v(T), and the diameter of trees at harvest, d(T). These functions
are deﬁned further.
5. Forest growth model
The Chapman-Richards function has been shown to provide a good repres-
entation of growth in timber volume, v(t), and basal area, a(t) (Venn et al.
2000, p. 75). So the growth of a forest stand can be represented as:
(6a)
(6b)
where the parameters θ, α and β are determined by the species of tree, environ-
mental conditions and forest management. Once parameterised, equation
(6a) is used to estimate timber volume at harvest, while equation (6b) is used
to estimate the average diameter of the trees as:
(7)
where tph is the number of trees per hectare. This equation is derived from
the formula for the area of a circle; the square-root term is multiplied by
100 to convert m to cm and by 2 to convert radius to diameter (hence the
200). The value of d is used to calculate the price received for the timber
harvest:
pv = γ0 + γ1 · d(T) (8)
If wood density and the proportion of carbon in stemwood biomass are
known, the stock of carbon in stemwood biomass (w(t), tC/ha), can be esti-
mated as:
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where  δ  is the carbon content per cubic meter of stemwood (tC/m
3).
Because equation (9) accounts only for stemwood, it underestimates the
carbon content of the forest. Stemwood represents approximately 70% of
forest biomass; the other 30% comprises branches and foliage
4. The ratio of
forest biomass to stemwood biomass depends on the type of tree and its
age. Young trees generally have more branches and foliage relative to stem
than old trees. This is represented in the following function, derived from
the model of Kirschbaum (2000):
(10)
where b(t) is the total carbon stock in the standing forest biomass (tC/ha),
φ and µ are parameters determined by tree shape, and the remaining varia-
bles have been previously deﬁned. Annual changes in the standing carbon
stock can now be estimated by differencing:
∆b(t) = b(t) − b(t − 1) (11)
Equations (6a), (8), (10) and (11) are substituted into (1) to (4), as neces-
sary, to represent a given accounting system. Only above-ground biomass
carbon has been considered here; b(t) includes stem, branches, and foliage,
but not carbon contained in the soil or roots. Including soil and root car-
bon will increase the stock of carbon that receives payment but will also
increase the cost of measuring that carbon; this is discussed by Cacho et al.
(2002b) and is not considered further in the present paper.
6. Land-use scenarios and model calibration
Tree-growth parameters for equations (6a) and (6b) are presented in
table 1 for two sites in south-eastern Australia. These parameters were esti-
mated statistically based on values reported by Wong et al. (2000), for
Eucalyptus nitens (commonly known as Shining Gum). The two sites are
described in table 2. Site 1 has high rainfall and Site 2 has moderate
rainfall.
Observed and predicted timber volumes of Eucalyptus nitens for the two
sites are presented in ﬁgure 2. The analysis of the carbon-accounting
methods was performed on both sites to gain insight into the consequences
4 Roots represent an additional 10–40% of above-ground biomass; soil carbon is not
part of forest biomass.
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that differences in soil type and rainfall have on the temporal path of
sequestration and the nature of the steady state. It is obvious that the
growth function (6a) provides a good ﬁt to the data. However, data were
only available for trees up to 10 years of age; this means that predic-
tions regarding the steady state that is reached after year 30 are uncertain.
Nonetheless, the predicted maximum volumes (given by θv  in table 1) at
steady state are plausible (843  m
3/ha and 263  m
3/ha for sites 1 and 2,
respectively).
Base values for other parameters used in the numerical model are pre-
sented in table 3. Model runs consisted of estimating function (5) for each
of the accounting systems (1) to (4), using the parameter values in table 1
and table 3. The optimal cycle length (T*), timber harvest (v*) and carbon
sequestered in biomass (b*) were estimated based on the value of T that
maximised equation (5). Then, for each accounting system, the optimal
amount of emissions offset (EO*) were calculated as the time-averaged CO2
equivalent stock in above-ground biomass:
Table 1 Tree parameter values used in the model, estimated from data reported by Wong et al.
(2000) with equations (6a) and (6b)
 
 







Table 2 Site Characteristics
 
 
Site 1 Site 2
Site code VRV140 EP205
Location Gippsland, VIC Mount Gambier, SA
Date planted August 1986 July 1988
Previous land use Improved Pasture Pasture




Annual pan evaporation (mm) 1018 1262
Slope Gentle (24–28%) Gentle
Altitude (m) 380 60
Soil type Sand over medium clay Structured, clay loam
Source: Wong et al. (2000).164 O.J. Cacho et al.
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Figure 2 Eucalyptus nitens growth at the two sites. Predicted (lines) and observed values (dots)
for Site 1 and Site 2. Data from Wong et al. (2000).
Table 3 Base parameter values
 
Parameter Value Units Description Source
γ0 −4.342 # Timber price intercept g
γ1 0.936 #/cm Timber price slope g
pb 20 #/t Price of CO2 a
r 6% Discount rate f
υ 3.67 t CO2/t C CO2 absorbed per unit of 
carbon ﬁxed in the forest
b
tph 250 trees/ha Tree density h
cE 2300 #/ha Establishment cost a
Te 46.4 year Equivalence time c
Ef 0.0215 1/year Equivalence factor c
δ 0.378 t C/m
3 Carbon content of wood d
φ 1.429 * Biomass in mature forest 
relative to stemwood biomass
e
µ 0.2 * Forest biomass parameter e
*unitless coefﬁcient. Sources: a, Hassall and Associates (1999); b, based on molecular weights of CO2 and
Carbon; c, Fearnside et al. (2000); d, estimated as wood density × Carbon content of biomass = 0.7 (t/m
3) ×
0.54; e, calculated from parameters presented by Kirschbaum (2000); f, arbitrary value subject to sensitivity
analysis; g, linear approximation to assumed data following discussions with Signor (2001, pers. comm.);
h, assumed value following discussions with Signor (2001, pers. comm.).Carbon accounting and reforestation 165
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(12)
Finally, the actual cost to the investor per emission offset ( ), in dollars
per tonne of CO2, was calculated as the present value of total carbon-credit
payments made by the investor to the landholder minus the present value
of credits redeemed, divided by EO*. The difference between the price of
carbon dioxide (pb) and the cost to the investor ( ) is that the former is
the spot price (assumed constant) paid at a given point in time, whereas the
latter is the actual cost to the investor of a permanent emission offset measured
in terms of present value. pb was the same for all accounting systems whereas
 was calculated for each accounting system (1) to (4) by applying the
inﬁnite-horizon equation for the optimal cycle length given by maximizing
equation (5).
7. Results
As discussed, the optimal cycle-length for the forest is determined by
maximising NPV (equation 5) with respect to time. The solution to this
problem depends on the accounting method used. By inserting equations
(1), (2), (3) or (4) into (5), the problem was solved for each of the four
accounting methods described earlier in the present report. Figure 3 shows
the objective function (5) plotted for selected accounting systems when
applied to growth data for Site 2.
With no carbon credits, it is optimal to harvest the forest after 15 years
in Site 2 (ﬁgure 3). This value corresponds to the maximum point on the
NPV curve (ﬁgure 3, solid dark line). Under both the tonne-year (2) and
ex-post full crediting (4) methods T* and NPV* are virtually the same as
with no credits, so curves for these accounting methods are not shown in
ﬁgure 3. With the tonne-year approach, annual returns from carbon credits
increases proﬁts slightly, but not enough to provide any incentive to grow
trees for longer. With the ex-post approach, carbon payments are too
delayed to have any inﬂuence on proﬁts, and it is not worthwhile extending
the cycle-length beyond that which is optimal when selling timber alone.
When carbon payments occur under either the ideal (1) or the ex-ante full
crediting (3) method, T* and NPV* both increase relative to the no-carbon-
credit case (ﬁgure 3). The ideal system causes the objective function to shift
up and to the right compared to the no-credits case. The ex-ante system
changes the shape of the objective function, that has a local maximum in
year 15 and a global maximum in year 73. The function becomes bimodal
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landholder decides to harvest before the equivalence time, no carbon
credits are received and proﬁt is the same as for the no-credits case. Carbon
payments are received upfront but only after the landholder has agreed to
keep each tonne sequestered by the forest for the equivalence time (46
years) or longer, and this would be a binding agreement. Hence, the incen-
tive to provide carbon-sequestration services depends on the relative height
of the two peaks in the objective function (ﬁgure 3), that in turn depends
on the discount rate and on the price of carbon relative to the price of timber.
The ex-ante method provides the greatest incentive to landholders to
farm trees for carbon as well as for timber. Optimal cycle-length is longest
and proﬁts are highest by a signiﬁcant margin with this method.
For any given method, the optimal cycle-length is associated with optimal
values of timber supply, emission offsets (EO*) and costs to the investor
( ). These values are presented in table 4 for both sites.
With no carbon credits, timber supply and EO* are larger for Site 1 than
for Site 2, as a result of the higher productivity of the former (table 4).
With the ex-post method, these optimal results are unchanged, because
Figure 3 Trajectories of net present value under three accounting systems in Site 2.
C I *Carbon accounting and reforestation 167
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
delayed payments give no incentive to landholders to provide carbon-
sequestration services. Under tonne-year accounting NPV increase by 15%
(to #16 467) in Site 1 and 77% (to #1818) in Site 2 relative to the no-credits
case, the investor pays #5.42 per tonne of CO2 offset, and T* increases by
1 year (to 17 years) in Site 1 and remains unchanged (at 15 years) in Site 2.
In terms of emissions offset, the optimal cycle lengths result in a 9 per cent
increase in Site 1 (EO* increases from 387 t CO2/ha to 424 t CO2/ha) and
no increase in Site 2 (140 t CO2/ha) when tonne-year accounting is intro-
duced. Thus the tonne-year approach provides little or no incentive to
landholders to sequester any more carbon than the incentive provided by
the timber market alone, especially in less productive land.
With the ideal and the ex-ante method EO* increases relative to the no
carbon-credits case, because of the longer cycle-lengths involved. The cost
to the investor is higher with the ex-ante method (approximately #23/t CO2)
than with the ideal method (approximately #13/t CO2). Carbon payments
have a much higher proportional effect on NPV in Site 2 than in Site 1,
indicating that the incentive is stronger in the less productive land,
although the carbon sequestration rate is also lower.
7.1 Sensitivity analysis
To  evaluate the effect of changes in the price of carbon and the discount
rate on the supply of emission offsets (EO*), and the cost to the investor
per tonne of carbon sequestered ( ), the model was solved for a range of
carbon prices (ranging from #4/t CO2 to #26/t CO2) and discount rates (2, 6
and 10%). As expected from the base results, only the ideal system and the













No credits 1 16 14 290 38.0 387 na
Ideal 1 18 19 707 37.7 459 12.75
Tonne-year 1 17 16 467 38.0 424 5.42
ex-ante 1 79 23 221 10.6 1060 23.66
ex-post 1 16 14 290 38.0 387 0.00
No credits 2 15  1026 14.4 140 na
Ideal 2 18  3014 13.5 176 13.06
Tonne-year 2 15  1818 14.4 140 5.42
ex-ante 2 73  5754 3.6 340 23.41
ex-post 2 15  1026 14.4 140 0.00
Figures represent optimal values, EO* = carbon-emissions offset per hectare, CI* = net cost to investor per
emissions offset (present value); na, not applicable.
C I *
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ex-ante system exhibited any signiﬁcant sensitivity within the ranges tested.
Hence the following discussion is limited to these two systems.
Under the ideal accounting system, the supply of emission offsets
increases as carbon price increases (ﬁgure 4a). The increase is step-wise
because it is caused by lengthening the forest cycle, and time is discrete in
the model. The elasticity of supply at the base carbon price is 0.25 in Site 1
and 0.41 in Site 2. So an increase in the price of carbon results in almost
twofold the response in EO supply in the less productive site.
Under the ex-ante method the elasticity of supply is zero at the base car-
bon price of #20/t CO2 (ﬁgure 4b). However, there is a very large increase in
EO supply at the ‘critical’ point at which the landholder enters the carbon
market. The switch from timber alone to timber and carbon farming depends
on the value of carbon relative to the value of timber (this is the price ratio
at which the second peak in ﬁgure 3 becomes higher than the ﬁrst peak).
The critical point at which supply jumps to a higher value (ﬁgure 4b)
Figure 4 Effect of carbon price on optimal solutions under the ideal (a and c) and ex-ante (b
and d) accounting methods. The top charts are the supply of emission offsets (EO*), the bot-
tom charts are cost to investor ( ) per tonne of emission offset. C I *Carbon accounting and reforestation 169
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occurs at a lower carbon price in Site 2 (at #10 EO* increases from 140 to
338 tonnes) than in Site 1 (at #14 EO* increases from 388 to 1055 tonnes),
because the value of timber is lower in the former as a result of lower
growth rates.
The investor cost ( ) increases with the carbon price for both account-
ing systems (ﬁgure 4c,d). This increase is slower under the ideal system
(the slope is 0.65) than under the ex-ante system (the slope is 1.17), because
annual payments are discounted under the former but not under the latter.
There is a discontinuity in the cost curve for the ex-ante method (ﬁgure 4d)
corresponding to the critical point described. The cost curves are practically
the same for both sites (except for the critical points in ﬁgure 4d).
As the supply responses described are the result of the long-term process
of carbon sequestration, the discount rate inﬂuences these relationships;
this is illustrated in ﬁgure 5. Under the ideal accounting system the supply
response becomes steeper as the discount rate increases (ﬁgure 5a). This is
because the present value of the timber harvest decreases as the discount
Figure 5 Effect of carbon price and discount rates on the supply of emission offsets (EO*) and
the investor cost ( ) under two accounting systems. Results are for Site 2 only. C I *
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rate increases and therefore the stream of carbon payments becomes rela-
tively more attractive. Under the ex-ante method, increases in the discount
rate cause the critical point to move to the left (ﬁgure 5b). This means that,
the higher the discount rate, the lower the carbon price required to entice
the landholder to enter the carbon market. At a discount rate of 10% the
supply response becomes ﬂat, indicating that the present value of the timber
harvest has become negligible relative to the value of carbon.
Increasing the discount rate causes the slope of the investor-cost function
()   to become less steep under the ideal accounting system (ﬁgure 5c),
but not under the ex-ante method (ﬁgure 5d). This occurs because carbon
credits are paid at the start of the project and are not discounted under the ex-
ante method, whereas under the ideal method the stream of carbon-credit
payments is discounted. The lower cost at higher discount rates (ﬁgure 5c)
occurs because the investor will have to ﬁnd an alternative project once the
forest is harvested (the carbon credits are redeemed by the landholder) and
the present value of this future cost is lower at higher discount rates.
8. Discussion
An important question raised by the foregoing analysis is: which account-
ing method is dominant in a Pareto sense? The question cannot be
answered unambiguously with the tools developed in the present paper,
because additional assumptions must be made regarding the opportunity
cost of planting trees and the nature of the contract between landholder and
investor, with its associated transaction costs. The results of our analysis,
however, can help elucidate the factors that will inﬂuence the answer to this
question.
The four carbon accounting systems considered in the present paper dif-
fer in terms of incentives to the landholder and cost to the investor. From
the standpoint of the landholder the ex-ante method dominates in terms of
NPV, but it is the most expensive to the investor (see NPV and   columns
in table 4). From the standpoint of the investor, the tonne-year approach
dominates because it has the lowest cost per tonne of carbon (  is #5.42),
but it provides little or no incentive to the landholder to sequester any more
carbon than the incentive provided by the timber market alone, especially
in the less productive site (see EO* in table 4). So the preferred accounting
system differs between the investor and the landholder.
8.1 Baselines
Under the assumptions of the present study the NPV of planting a forest in
the absence of carbon credits was positive for both sites (#14 290/ha in Site
C I *
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1 and #1026/ha in Site 2), which means that the forestry enterprise would be
acceptable to the landholder. However, forestry may not be the most attrac-
tive alternative. If the current land use is pasture, and grazing yields an
NPV greater than #14 290/ha in Site 1 or greater than #1026/ha in Site 2,
then the landholder would not enter forestry unless a large enough incentive
to change land use is available. If, however, forestry is the best alternative
available to the landholder, then the baseline (the without-project scenario)
is a forestry rotation of 16 years in Site 1 and 15 years in Site 2 (see the
no-credit cases in table 4).
The baseline is critical because only the marginal increase in carbon
stocks (carbon with project minus carbon without project) would be cred-
ited as an offset to the investor. As an arbitrary example, with a discount
rate of 6%, an annual crop or livestock enterprise producing an annual
proﬁt of #120/ha will have a NPV of #2000/ha. Applying this information
to Site 2 we see that a forest for timber only (NPV = #1026/ha) or receiving
carbon credits under tonne-year accounting (NPV = #1818/ha) would not
be preferred to agriculture, but carbon farming under the ideal system
(NPV = #3014/ha) or the ex-ante system (NPV = #5754) would be the pre-
ferred system. Under the assumptions of the present study, the tonne-year
approach would provide an incentive to switch from agriculture to forestry
(in Site 2) if the annual proﬁt from agriculture were less than #109 per hectare
per year, which results in an NPV for agriculture of #1818/ha.
To  illustrate the relevance of the baseline, table  5 shows marginal
increases in carbon stocks under two different baseline assumptions. In the
ﬁrst case (third and fourth columns in table 5), the baseline is assumed to













Ideal 1 454 13.10 72 83.01
Tonne-year 1 419 5.59 37 64.01
ex-ante 1 1055 23.80 673 37.33
ex-post 1 382 0.00 0 na
Ideal 2 173 13.52 37 63.93
Tonne-year 2 137 5.80 0 na
ex-ante 2 337 23.66 200 39.82
ex-post 2 137 0.00 0 na
na, not applicable.
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be a pasture with an average carbon stock of 5 t CO2 equivalents/ha in Site
1 and 3 t CO2 equivalents/ha in Site 2 (to be deducted from the EO column
in table 4). In the second case (ﬁfth and sixth columns in table 5), the
baseline is assumed to be a forestry enterprise managed for timber only,
with average carbon stocks of 387  t  CO2  equivalents/ha in Site 1 and
140 t CO2 equivalents/ha in Site 2 (based on results in table 4). With a pas-
ture baseline, the investor cost per tonne of CO2 ranges between #5.59 and
#23.80 (table  5), whereas with the forest baseline the cost increases to
between #37.33 and #83.01. At these costs, the case of a forest baseline
would probably not be attractive to the investor, as cheaper alternatives
may be available elsewhere.
An interesting result in table 5 is that with a pasture baseline the ideal
system has a lower investor cost than the ex-ante system (#13 v #23),
whereas the opposite occurs with a forest baseline (#83 v #37). This is
because with a forest baseline the marginal increase in carbon stocks under
the ideal system is produced by keeping the forest for an additional 2 or
3 years relative to the baseline (18 v 16 years in Site 1 and 18 v 15 years
in Site 2) and this occurs when the rate of carbon sequestration by the for-
est has slowed down. Under the ex-ante system the marginal increase in
carbon stocks is caused by keeping the forest for an additional 58–63 years,
which allows the forest to reach maturity and the carbon stocks to be main-
tained for several decades. As   is calculated by dividing the total cost to
the investor by the time-averaged emissions offset, the smaller marginal
increase in EO* under the ideal system results in a higher cost per tonne of
CO2 offset.
8.2 Transaction Costs
So far the analysis has assumed zero transaction costs, but transaction
costs are probably high in carbon sink projects, especially in the initial
stages, as parties learn how to implement and manage contracts. Transac-
tion costs are the costs ‘of arranging a contract to exchange property rights
ex-ante and monitoring and enforcing the contract ex-post, as opposed to
production costs, which are the costs of executing a contract’ (Matthews
1986, p. 906). Model results need to be re-interpreted in the presence of
transaction costs.
From the standpoint of the landholder who receives a price pb per tonne
of CO2  sequestered, our results implicitly assume that the investor will
cover all the transaction costs of participating in the carbon market. So the
cost to the investor (the present cost per CO2 emission offset) will be higher
than indicated by  . This means that, in deciding whether to invest in a
sink project, the investor will have to weigh the total cost (carbon-credit
C I *
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payments plus transaction costs, in present-value terms) against the alter-
native, such as the cost of an emissions tax or the present value of investing
in emission-reduction technology.
From the standpoint of the investor who receives emission offsets at a
cost of   per tonne of CO2, our results implicitly assume that the land-
holder bears the transaction costs. This can be represented in the model as
a lower price received by the landholder than the price paid by the investor,
with the difference being the transaction cost per tonne of CO2 sequestered.
Between the two extremes, where all transaction costs are born by either
the investor or the landholder, there is an inﬁnite number of possible com-
binations of shared costs. The sensitivity analyses on pb can help to illus-
trate the effect of transaction costs. By either increasing CI or decreasing
pb, the gap introduced by transaction costs can be represented from the
standpoint of either the investor or the landholder. This is shown based on
the results for the ideal accounting (ﬁgure 4a,c) in Site 2. The supply
response was converted into a smooth function by ﬁtting a regression line
to the step-wise results from ﬁgure 4a. The resulting analysis is presented in
ﬁgures 6 and 7.
Figure 6 shows the effect of transaction costs born by the landholder.
The top panel is the cost to the investor ( ) and the bottom panel is the
Figure 6 Effect of transaction costs (TC) on the carbon price received by landholders and
the supply of emission offsets, when transaction costs are born by the landholder. Results for
Site 2.
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supply of emission offsets by the landholder (EO*). Assume that the investor
is willing to spend a maximum of #15/t CO2 (i.e. the size of an emission tax);
this means that the investor would be prepared to pay up to approxim-
ately #23 per tonne of CO2 under the ideal accounting method (indicated
by point a). At this price, the landholder would be willing to supply 180
tonnes of CO2 per hectare, indicated by point b. This is the outcome in the
absence of transaction costs. If, in order to enter the carbon market the
landholder faces transaction costs TC (expressed as dollars per tonne of
CO2), the effective carbon price received by the landholder would be #23
minus TC, or approximately #14 in the arbitrary example shown in Figure
6, this corresponds to point c, where only approximately 160 t CO2/ha are
supplied.
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of transaction costs born by the investor.
The top and bottom panel are the same as in Figure 6, but there is an addi-
tional cost curve (C2) representing a shift caused by transaction costs. In
the absence of transaction costs, curve C1  applies and the outcome
(180 t CO2/ha supplied at point b) is the same as before. With transaction
costs the relevant curve is C2. If, as before, the investor will pay a maximum
of #15 per tonne, the price paid to the landholder will decrease (to approx-
imately #14 in this example) and the supply of emission offsets will be lim-
ited to approximately 160 tonnes. The effect of the transaction cost on the
Figure 7 Effect of transaction costs (TC) on the carbon price received by landholders and the
supply of emission offsets, when transaction costs are born by the investor. Results for Site 2.Carbon accounting and reforestation 175
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producer price is indicated by TC in ﬁgure 7. So, when the investor has
alternative options for emission offsets (or faces a tax) the effect of trans-
action costs on the landholder are equivalent, independently of whether
those costs are born by the producer or by the landholder.
The fact that the landholder always bears the transaction cost when the
investor has other options in the carbon market, does not mean that the
transaction costs will be equal whether they are covered by the investor or
the landholder. If the investor has better access to information and exper-
tise in carbon monitoring, or if economies of size exist, then it may well be
that the total cost of the carbon-offset transaction is lower when the inves-
tor pays for participating in the market (i.e. when the cost curve shifts from
C1 to C2 in ﬁgure 7) than when the landholder pays (as in ﬁgure 6). Hence,
the design of the ‘right’ contract between investor and landholder can
beneﬁt both parties by reducing total transaction costs. This was pointed
out by Dietrich (1994), who stated that transaction-cost savings can result
in ‘mutual ﬁnancial advantage’ (Dietrich 1994, p. 43).
It is important to note that these results are on a per-hectare basis, so the
supply function does not include any possible area response. However,
because transaction costs reduce the amount of carbon sequestered per
unit area (as illustrated in ﬁgures 6 and 7) the investor will need a larger
area to offset a given amount of CO2.
To  apply our results any further in comparing accounting systems it
would be necessary to calculate the transaction costs per emission offset.
We  do not attempt to provide quantitative estimates of transaction costs,
but will discuss how they will probably vary between accounting systems.
Brief deﬁnitions of transaction costs are presented in the following text, fol-
lowed by a discussion on how these may differ between accounting systems.
Only the ideal, tonne-year and ex-ante methods are considered, the ex-post
method is no longer discussed, as it provides no carbon-sequestration
incentives.
Transaction costs of carbon-sink projects can be classiﬁed into seven cat-
egories (Cacho et al. 2002a): (i) search costs are incurred as investors and
hosts (landholders) seek partners for mutually advantageous projects; (ii)
negotiation costs are the costs of interested partners coming to an agree-
ment; (iii) veriﬁcation and certiﬁcation costs  occur when the negotiated
exchange must be approved by an accredited agency, veriﬁcation refers to
checking the validity of the claims of a project, whereas certiﬁcation occurs
ex post, once sequestration has occurred (Moura-Costa et al. 2000); (iv)
implementation costs are associated with the resources expended in admin-
istering the translation of a project design into practice; (v) monitoring
costs  are incurred to measure the greenhouse-gas abatement actually
achieved by the project, as opposed to forecasts; (vi) enforcement costs are176 O.J. Cacho et al.
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the expenses of achieving compliance (or obtaining compensation) if mon-
itoring detects divergences from the agreed terms of the transaction; (vii)
insurance costs arise from the risk of project failure.
The costs most probable to diverge between accounting systems are mon-
itoring, enforcement and insurance costs.
Carbon monitoring costs (in terms of dollars per tonne) are sensitive to
project size, the geographical dispersion of project parcels, and the hetero-
geneity of the environment (Cacho et al. 2002b). None of these factors will
vary between accounting systems for a given site and size of project. How-
ever, the frequency and timing of monitoring costs will differ: the ideal and
tonne-year methods require annual measurements of carbon stocks for the
duration of the project, whereas the ex-ante method requires measurement
only at the end of the project, to verify that the agreed amount of carbon
has been stored in the forest. Although some sort of regular monitoring
would be desirable in the ex-ante case, to ensure that the land has not been
deforested, this could be based on low-cost method such as aerial photo-
graphs or satellite images that do not require on-site measurement of car-
bon stocks. Monitoring costs could be reduced by undertaking actual
measurement of forest-carbon stocks at longer intervals (i.e. every 5 years)
and using predictive models to set a schedule of annual payments. The
payment schedule (and model assumptions) would be adjusted after each
monitoring event based on actual outcomes.
The tonne-year system may not require insurance against premature
release of CO2, whereas both the ideal and ex-ante systems will. The ex-ante
system requires insurance against premature carbon loss for the entire
project length, because full payment for sequestration services occurs at the
beginning; therefore this system would incur the highest insurance cost.
Under the ideal system, credit is assigned when carbon is sequestered and
debits accrue when carbon is emitted. In this case, insurance may play a
role in hedging against price ﬂuctuations, where the value of debits for pre-
mature carbon release is higher than the original value paid for the credits
when the carbon was initially sequestered, but the main purpose of insur-
ance would be to ensure that the investor obtains compensation when the
forest is harvested (or goes up in smoke). The cost of this insurance is
dependent on the future price of carbon, which, because of its uncertainty,
will probably make the cost of insurance large.
Insurance and enforcement costs under the ideal system could be reduced
by adjusting the payment schedule so as to avoid the need to redeem pay-
ments at the end of the project. This could be achieved by ﬁnding a factor
by which annual payments are reduced, so as to make the NPV of the new
system (requiring no carbon-credit redemption) equal to the NPV of the
ideal system (requiring redemption at the end of the project). This systemCarbon accounting and reforestation 177
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would be a hybrid between the tonne-year and the ideal system, with the
equivalence factor being based on economic principles.
9. Summary and conclusions
The present paper was motivated by the potential of land-use change and
forestry projects to beneﬁt from emerging emission-offset markets. The
paper presents an analysis of four carbon-accounting methods that have
been proposed to deal with the problem of permanence, so as to make tem-
porary carbon sequestration by forests equivalent to permanent emission
reductions in the energy sector. The analysis is based on the standard inﬁnite-
horizon forestry model, extended to include the value of payments obtained
in exchange for carbon-sequestration services. The four accounting methods
are compared based on their net-present value from the standpoint of a
landholder considering planting trees.
Results of numerical experiments are presented, based on a simple growth
model for Eucalyptus nitens trees planted in high- and moderate-rainfall areas
in south-eastern Australia. The results are used to compare net beneﬁts to land-
holders and investors in the absence of transaction costs. Sensitivity analy-
sis is undertaken to derive emission-offset supply responses at the ﬁrm-level
(expressed as tonnes of CO2 offset per hectare) and investor-cost curves
(expressed as the present value of payments per tonne of emission offset).
It is shown that the tonne-year approach, a carbon-accounting method
that has attracted much interest in the policy debate surrounding the Kyoto
Protocol, offers little or no incentives to landholders to plant commercial
forests under plausible assumptions regarding tree growth rates, prices,
costs and discount rates in Australia. The tonne year approach, however,
will probably have lower enforcement and insurance costs than other
approaches, and therefore offers some advantages.
Model results are used to explain the importance of the baseline (the
‘business as usual’ scenario) and the implications of transaction costs. The
transaction costs that will vary between accounting methods are identiﬁed and
suggestions are presented to reduce some of these costs. To carry the present
analysis any further requires speciﬁc assumptions on project size and details
of the contract between investor and landholder, so the per-hectare models
developed here would need to be extended to the project level, involving a
large area of land under the management of one or more landholders.
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